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EDITORS' FOREWORD 
This pamphlet contains the text of a fecture dtlivmd 
at the School of Economics of the National University of Mexico 
on March 10, 1963, Mom Aguilar studied economia at New 
York University and Columbia in 1H5-1946 More joining the 
facuIty of the School where he is now a Prof- of Economics. 
He is also Coordinator of the Executive Commission of the 
M&can National L i b t i o n  Mwtment which was founded 
in 1961 and has become the center of the struggle of the 
Mexican people to rwive and put into practice the Mty id& 
of the Mexican RevoIution. 
Except in a few instance8 where English were readiIy 
availabIe, quotations from Engbh-hguagc documents and 
periodicals have been -atad from the Spanish of Seiior 
Aguilar's text and hence will be found to deviate from the 
original wordings. We are satisfied that rm misinterpretations 
or misundmtandings can arise from this source. 
This is the M analpis of the Alliance for Pro- we have 
yet seen. The more w i d e  it is read--and dipkc-in this 
c o u n v  the better it wiII be for all of us on both sides of the 
border. 
Leo Huberman 
Pad M. Swcezy 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS 
Pmhably no topic has attracted as much a&m in 
ht in  Amuica during thc past few years, or been given as 
much publicity, as the AlIiance for Progcm. No day gotp by 
without some of our publications making mention of it, in the 
enigmatic and by now commonly accepted h q p g c  of abbrevia- 
tions, w that (in Spanish) it b now known a~ ALPRO (Alianza 
@ra el Prog~eso). It is referred to -hat: in the state- 
mcnto of government uE&ls and d bwhsrnen ,  in +tical 
and trade union m e w ,  in lccturc halls and at round tables. 
During the past few months aIom thousands of pages have 
been written on the AUiance and t h u s a d s  of tons of ink and 
p a p  haw been dedicated to it 
Ytt, wtt this m d  b g e  of propaganda, m m  
peaple still do not know much abut the famous Alhme. 
They don't know, because most of what has beta sxid not only 
is Iacking in objectivity but docs not originate from a thorough 
study of this new showpiece of P a n - A m e r i d  While some 
eommmtatom and publicb confint themselves to the reptition 
of cornrnonphcw and m v c n t i o d  ddamtions of loyalty, orhem 
per& in a somewhat dogmatic ovmhplif~cation of thc Alliance 
immlmttlt of fomign pcmtim and foreign GxpIoimi011 
of Latin Amdca. Thus, it is not s q n h h g  that many are 
confused as to ALPRO's functions and its potential importance. 
Is it indeed the best, or for that matter the only, mad tqward 
prqrtss for the p p I e  of Latin America? Is it, in effect, the 
'kwolution of gm~t expectatiom," as thcy call it so enthusiastic- 
ally in the Unitui Statts? Or is it just: another blind alIcy, a 
trtachmus flusion which will lead only to dknchantmtnt and 
frusmtion? 
To ascertain tht sigficanet of the AUiance for P r o p ,  
we first need to have a dear picture d the economic and 
fitid situation throughout Latin Amexica; moreover, we 
need to consider the origin of the Alliance, the princip1e.s on 
which it is based, the objectives which it pursues, the ways and 
meam by which it se& to obtain its goals, and the manner in 
wbich it operates. Bridiy, and as systematically as is &ble 
within the limits of this paper, I shall attempt to examine 
ttaese qudoas* 
Economic Trends in Latin America 
Latin America emerged from the !kcand Wodd War with 
many u m I v e d  problcm and many unsatisfied aspirations. 
Prior to the economic collapse of 1929, most Latin American 
muntria Wtved that industrihtion done would help to 
mmgthen and diversify their econornits, assure independence, 
and raise the o v e d  standard of living. Howwer, the Depression 
and the economic decline of the 1930's hampered any pro- 
in terms of economic development. It was the temporary absence 
of the great powers from tbe shrinking world market of the war 
years wbich, although it caused confusion in the supply of 
capital g a d ,  acted as a factor stimulating the industrial 
development of the principai Latin American countria. If the 
benefits of the period were accompanied by errors, difficulties, 
and a certain disequilibrium, nevertheftss production grew 
rapidly (the rate of growth s u p s i n g  6 percent per annum 
during the years f 942-195 1 1, and Latin America experienced 
a brief spell of prosperity. There was an increase in population 
as well as an increw in investment and employment; industrial 
production expanded, as did foreign trade, both in terms of 
value and volume; the balance of payments was favorable; 
prices = in the domcstic market; and commercial ventum 
of every kind mushmomed. 
With the exception of 1949, when the m&on in the 
United Stat= began to make itself felt and when the rate d 
invatmat in Latin America declined appm&bIy, the decade 
of the 40's was one of n$d expansion, When immediate pros- 
pacb appeared to btcome 1- fawrabk, an unexpected event 
occumd in the form of the Korean War, which once again 
acted aa 3 B o t  in the arm to the flagging economy of our 
c o f l h t .  The war d k d  in a growing demand for raw 
smprovcd archangG an increase, in haudd 
apacit+a brief, a new stimulus to Latin A m a i m  invatmcnt 
and productivity. During the stvtn years from the end of the 
h n d  World War to 1952, thc countria which showed the 
highat raw of qmsion4xtween 6 and 9 percent annually- 
= Guatemala, El Salvador, B d ,  Colombia, VenczueIa, with 
Peru and Mexico d y  slightly behind. 
After 1952 the picture changed dramatically. The Korean 
War cast the United States as many, or more, men as had the 
Second Wodd War but it failed to maintain the ecopomic prok 
p i t y  of tht continent. In 1952, priw went down for wool, 
meat, qucbracho, sugar, and other products. The fall in prices 
continued during the following year, with mtton, lead, and tin 
joining in the decline. This tmnd mmed to €x halted in 1954, 
when prices for coffee, wool, cocoa, oil, and copper went up; 
but after 1957 the fall in prices of the principd mineral and 
agricdtural p d u c &  became u n i d ,  and tbt situation became 
incmshgly unfavomble in terms of foreign exchange. 
Taking 1953 as 100, an indtK showing the relation of 
export prim to import price3 rase to 109 in 1954, fell to 92 
ixl 1957, and to 84 during the y a s  1958-1961. This, according 
to a rough but conservative estimate, implies thc Im of a p  
prwximately $1,500 d o n  ptr 2mnum for Latin America 
since the period 1950-1953. (Report of the Committee of &in# 
of the Inter-Amen'can Economic and S o d  Coarncil, Septemkr, 
1962, p. 45.) 
Between 1957 and 1961 alone, gold and foreign currency 
holdings in Ltin Amkca decmmd by approximatdy $1,000 
&on, and the rate of mnomic growth lost the impetus of 
previous years. During the years 1944-1950, the average annual 
rate of growth of per capita production stood at 3.5 p e n t ;  in 
1951-1955 it fell to 2.2 percent, in 1956-1957 to 1.4 percent, 
during the fdowing two years to lm than 0.7 percent; and 
during 1960-1961 it hardly went above 1 percent. In mrne 
mun&~ we wtn note an W u t c  decline in per capita pro- 
duction, whife the region as a whole s u f f d  fmm a state of 
stagnation. A paradoxical interaction of deflationary and infIa- 
tionary forces simultaneously caused a risc in prices and a drop 
in anploymmt, deficib in most national budgets, a diseqd- 
libriurn in the balance of payments, and a series of drastic 
dtvaluations. 
Instead of slowly sppmacbg the rate of income of the 
inddaiized nations, thc countria of Latin America have, in 
reality, fallen farther and farther behind, with the way of life 
of the d, piviIeged minorities contrasting ever more sharply 
with the miserable living conditions of the vast majority. We 
could point to the dtspair, the ignomce, and the neglect of 
millions of peasants in thc Northeast of Brazil, in the Northeast 
of w t i n a ,  in the northern desert of Mexico, as well as 
atong the coastal @ a h  of w r  South, in the plateaus of 
Venezuela, on the pfantations d Honduras and Guatemala, 
and high up in the Peruvian Andes; we could point to the 
incredible conditions of the working& sections of Santiago, 
Cmcas, Lima, Mexico City, and Rio de Jan&, where 
hundreds of h w n d s  of disillusioned workers and social out- 
casts live in overcrowded quarters which lack any kind of 
sanitary facilities. Suffice it to say that today, as yyesterday, the 
saddest and most deprtssing feature of Latin Arn&ca's &a1 
panorama is the continued misery of her people. With the 
exception of a small sector which lives in disgraceful ostenta- 
tiousnc59, arr incipient middle c h  which is beginning to make 
its& felt in the urban areas, and isoIated p u p s  of industrid 
workm whose s h d a r d  of living has slowly risen, the vast 
majority Iivm in complete h e l p l m n ~ f r o m  the Rio Bravo ta - 
Cape Horn They cat badly; they hardly own any clothes; they 
continue to vegetate in the d a r h  of illiteracy; they lack 
the m t  ind+nsabIc public d m ;  they are threatened with 
unemployment or suffering from underemployment; they live 
in subhuman housing which lacks alI and any hygienic facilities; 
and thcy caaily fd victim ta iIInw and premature death. 
Today, as at the btginning of 1961 when the Alliance for 
Progrm~ was launched, t h e  am thc hard smkd and tconomic 
realitits in Latin America. I need only add that the very timing 
of the Alliance minddcd with growing pow discontent and 
political instability which have since btcomc accentuated in 
Brad3 El Salvador, Guatada, the Dominican Republic, 
alnbia, Vmezutta, Argmtina, and Peru. It a h  coincided 
with an upurge of rcprtssion and violence in several comtrits 
and with the consolidation and p m  of the Cuban Revolution. 
The Origims of fhe Alliance and ih Obieetiver 
The AUianct for P v  was launched in Washington on 
the 13th of March, 1961. It was fathered by John F, Kennedy, 
President of the United Statts, who in a rn-ge to the nations 
of the Hemisphere aaked thcm to unite ''in a new Alliance for 
Pmgrm, a vast cmptratiw. effort, unpnlleltd in magnitude 
and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American 
peopk. . , . If the countria of Latin America," said Mr. Ken- 
nedy, "are. ready to do their part, then, I believe, tbe United 
States, for its part, should provide help of a scope and magnitude 
-dent to make this bdd development program a success. . . . 
Let us once again awaken our American Revolution until it 
guides the struggle d people tvuywhere-not with an im@- 
iam of force or fear--but the d t  of courage and freedom and 
h w  for the future d man," With this passionate proclamation 
the Alliance for Pro- was born. 
The propods put forward by the head d the American 
government began to take shape five months Iater at the 
Inter-American Conference of Punk dd Este, hefd in August 
of 1961. T h e  conference adopted two important statements, 
'The &&ration of the Pmph of Amtrica" and ''The Charter 
of Punta dd Estt," and passed a number of cesolutions on 
vaxious concrete matters. In the Dedaration, the governments 
agreed to establish the "Alliance for P- . . . a vast effort to 
bring a better life to all the peoples of the continen&" and 
a f f h t d  that the Alliance was impid by thc Charter of the 
OAS, O p t i o n  P a n - M c a ,  and the Act of Bogota, and was 
founded on the phdple ''that frat men working through the 
iastitutions of mpmcntative dem- can best satisfy man's 
aspirations, including thoat for work, home and land, health 
and schools." On this b&, host who signad the Declaration 
9oIcmdy promised: 
To imprwe and stttqthen demouatic institutions. . . . 
To d m t e  d c  and d development. . . . 
To encourage, in d c e  with the characte&ic?1 of a h  
country, programs of compreh&ve agrarian re- 
form.. . . 
To mure fair waga, . . . 
To wipe out illiteracy and extend the benefits of educa- 
tion.... 
To refom tax laws, demanding more from those who have 
m t .  . . . 
To maintain monetary and fiscal policies which will protect 
the ptmhsing p e r  of the many. . . . 
To find quick and W n g  solutions to the grave probIem 
created by e x e v e  price fluctuations in the basic 
exports.. . . 
To accelerate the integration of Latin America. 
The other basic dxument, the Charter of Punta del Este, 
laid down the Alliance's objectives, ib basic principl~, and 
methods of operation, stating as its main aim the acceleration 
of economic development and a rise in the standard of living. 
In this rapact it was considered mential to maintain, during 
the coming decade, an annual rate of economic growth of not 
less than 2.5 percent per -pita. The Chartcr a h  made rdcrence 
to other propah which closely compondcd to the ambitions 
put fonvard in the so-called D e h t i o n ,  enumerating such 
diverse factors as might contribute to s p d y  development and 
at the same time solve some of the more p d n g  pbIems. - 
As for foreign aid, Latin America was assured of $20,000 
million in loans and investments during the 10-year period. 
The Alliance in Practice: Organ'mtion and Methods of Operation 
The Charter of Punta dd  Estc insisted that Latin American 
development should be bmd on national development pro- 
grams, economic integration, and stability in the prices of basic 
export commodities. It also asked for the introduction of land 
reform, tax reform, and reforms in the fields of education, 
politics, public admhhmtion, and hbor. Even if other basic 
conditions wodd bc nec;essary for the economic development 
of our peoplq the masum k e d  at Punta deI h are un- 
doubted~ very important. To admit their importance, however, 
is much easier than to prow their fdbility under pmxnt 
or to accept the Alliance's methods of opuatioa. 
In accordan- with the Charter, ALPRO's p e p a l  body 
is the m-ded Committee of Nine which is c o m ~ d  of exptrts 
and is attached to tht Inkr-American Economic and Social 
Council. The C o b t t e e k  main functions arc to atdhh nom 
for dwclopment programs as w d  as methods d &tria for 
their w-duation, and to follow M y  the work of the Ad Hoc 
mumittee. The Committet of Nine is a h  to coopate with 
individd governments in the adjustment and revision of 
projects, to publiazt projects under d d e r a f o n ,  and to co- 
o p t e  with the Secretary General of the OAS and the various 
inmmational monttary W e s .  
In addition to the Committee of Nine, there ah vazious 
Ad Hoc C U ~ ~ ~  whose. admhhbative work is in the hands 
of officiafs appcinted by the Executive k t a r y  of tht Inter- 
American Economic and Sodal Council. 
The Ad Hoc committed main task lies in the revision and 
tvaluation of national devclopmmt program. To date (March, 
1963), such programs have k e n  submitted by Bolivia, Colombia, 
Chile, Mexico, and VenemeIa. Thae countria have already 
asked for an evaluation on the part of the OM, and H o n d m  
and Panama arc about to follow suit. 
Thc remarkable feature of the Alliance's internal o r g a b -  
tim is that, quite apart from -live defects, the entire 
table of oqammtion is subordinate to the OAS and thus, directly 
or indirectly, dependent on the United Stam. In thh connection, 
we note the following: 
(1 ) Ttodom Mowm, the Alliance's American co-ordimtor, 
acts not like a fundonary of the United Stata, limiting him- 
d to the defense of his country's intmstp, but rather likc a 
ldnd of idedcght and boa of ALPRO. Hc hands out public 
statements, provides inwprehtim and advice, cmmm p r o m  
and even decida pcmmdly on important policy matters, acting 
in a manner which no Latin American obfidd would ever dare 
to hitate. Not surpishgly, Moscohlo has b m t  one of the 
~ O f t h C A Z l i a n c e .  
(2)  The Cormrdttce of Nint and the Ad HOC cormnittea 
are m m t t  to the OAS, an organhation in which the 
Amaim gwcmmmt hofds the M v c  balarux. Wc have 
already mentioned tbat one of the f d m  of thc ComMittcc 
ofNinef tocoilahttwiththe SecmqGcnwalofthcOAS 
and with intcrnahd monckry bdim Subordimtion to the 
OM, howcvcr, is even more direct. The entire work of the 
Camnittee ~volvm around the S e c ~ h r y  General or around 
tht Inter-Ammican Economic a d  Social C o d ,  The technical 
smfi of the Commitkc of Nine i furnished by the OM; the 
. . 
achmtadve and technical v n n e l  is contracted for by the 
OM; commitka ust thc swiw and imtaIIations of the OM, 
and the evaluation of development propnu is to a large extent 
b a d  on tbe principla of the OAS U r .  
Even more serious ia the fact that the mrnmittm operate 
on the bash of criteria which frequently cam damage to, and 
intdm with the sovereignty of, Latin Ammican republics. The 
oommitttcs do not & t h d w  to = p a  to the inter- 
n a t i d  monetary bodia on behaIf of those whom thcy arc to 
rcpmcnt, but rather tend to treat all Latin American govern- 
ments as m m  debtors, and ioreign hanks and the govemmmt of 
the United Staw ordinmy creditors, forgetting that inter- 
national f w C ; n g ,  aincc it invdves agreemeats - sovtr- 
ugn statw, cannot be handled on the same basis as private 
~OmrnCrCkd MQW 
Let us study the opewtions af the Ad Hoc commitkm in 
greater detaiI. We have alrrady smsed the role of national 
development pmgrams within the framework of the m a n =  
From this role, states the Committee of Nine in the report al- 
ready d a d  to, "stem the impomce of the Ad Hoc com- 
mittee's d u a ~ o n ,  considering as it doel kmth the needs and 
the pos9ibilitia of rcalization, at home and abroad." (Ibid., p. 
15. ) The function of these cornmi- is by no meam a matter 
uf routine, for they am concerned with nothing less than the 
evaluation and rexiion of national pmgramrs, '%y b y e  of their 
ability to pmmote the dcvelopmcnt of a country, on the basis 
of the vatidity of the fin's cconamic and social objectim, the 
dom& effort required, and the c d t e n c y  of the m w w w  
pprrsed for its &tion." (Ibid., p 18.) The Ad Hoc com- 
mi-' functions arc in f l e a  so broad that any one of them 
can at any time object to a plan hause it ~3nsidcm its 
objtctiva mectptable, whcthtr b u s t  the mtq in question 
fads to ea- P'ivabt mttrpfise mfwmtfy or k w  the 
mcasurts mggmd a p p r  inadcquatt to the OAS w. 
The committcamaystlsomspd thcexccutiondaprugram 
or p @ n c  its d d c r a t h .  This was dont recently with regard 
to Bolivia's Ten Year Plan, d y  btcause tht d t t e e  
& d d  it pacrwablc to suggtst & tmtrgmcy mcasuml 
and to defer hdefinitely ddcration of thc Bolivian govcm- 
m e n t ' s p I a m T h e ~ t t e t o f N i n e h a s c a n i e d m a t t e ~ ~ i w  
far that, under the pfttcxt of 'Yormutatim and execution d a 
program constituting s mntinuws pcea," it has encomged 
thc Ad Hoc cuwnittcc in question to follow dostly the develop- 
ment program in action and to s u e  what- modifica- 
tions might appear pertinent. It has also pro-d that the 
government concerned authorize the Ad Hoc committee not 
only to evaluate its pmgmm as it affects p t t n u  creditom, 
but a h  to report on the type of studies undertaken, the type. 
of problems affected, and to comment on any other a p c t  of 
the country's internal situation 
What is the Iegd basis of thae committea and of their 
power to interfere? The committees' f u n c t i o t a t c s  the Corn- 
mittee of Nin- anaXogou8 to those of judges; the com- 
mittees act as an "impartial court." As it happens, however, the 
impartial judge immediately turns into a police officer, for 
where foreign financial aid is granted on the basis of a corn- 
mittet recommendation, the committat is ' h d m  m o d  obliga- 
tian to see to it that such aid is being properly used." (Ibid., 
p. 19.) 
How L it e b l e  for a free and sovereign nation to 
submit the fundament. mciples of its social and economic 
policy as weIl as its national development program to a com- 
mittee of fortign experts, appointed according to criteria e b -  
lishcd by the OAS? How can we explain an independent 
gowmmtnt's agreeing to abide by the allegedly impartial verdict 
of thc "judges" &g on thc Ad Hoc committees? How can 
a govemmcnt pennit such a committee not d y  to make 
okwations and m s p d  or ptpone considemtion of its na- 
tional development pmgram, but alm to watch o w  its pro- 
and to propwrt whatever m&catiom may be q u k - i n  thr 
duct's view-to adjust it to the Chamx of Punta del 
h? How k it e b l e  that without any legal foundation the 
Committee of Nine considers it& to have the "implicit q n -  
aimtf' to A t e  all natiod development programs? Must 
we copclude that the ht in  W c a f l  m e n &  ham C O ~ -  
W to sukitute tht opinions of a p u p  of foreign experts 
for thdr awn cwcutive p~werg  their own mdtutiona, their 
own pdammts, and thdr national dignity? 
No, for the problem is subtler and more complu~ Inter- 
vmtion on the part af OAS d w  daes not mhtute a 
formaI part of the Ahnee. ALPROf basic documents were not 
drawn up by b e g h a s  or by p m m  unaware of Latin American 
waibilities; they were dnwn up by cdentiotm and competent 
lawyers who, confronted 14th juridical p r o b h  and their 
political implicatiorrs, fed as much at home as a duck in water. 
Patagaph 3 of Chapter V of the Charter states in precise 
tern: "Each government, if it so wishes, may p m t  its pm- 
gram for economic and d d  M o p m e n t  for considcration 
by an Ad Hoc Committee" From this it may be deduced that, 
should a gavtrnrnent not so d&, it wilI Gmply not do so. 
Yet, if presentation d development programs to the OAS 
is merely optional, why do so many governmenta hurry to 
Washington to ask leaw: of that organization? In reality, they 
do so not for juridical masom but on the basis of political 
reality, and in the belief that if they fail to submit their 
program for evduation, revhion, and modification by the OAS 
committees, these programs will become a dead letter for lack 
of financial as&ance. 
The Committee of Nine has been very eloquent in regard to 
Ad Hoc mkttee  deGons: "It is in no way obligatory to 
ask for a decision, nor to accept it or comply with it. T h e  
proceedings, however, can be s u c d d  only on the basis of 
evaluation and ~mmmmdations; and unless their integrity is 
subject to reasonable criticism, thm rc~mcndations should 
bt accepted and acted u p "  (Ibid,, p. 18.) Latin American 
countries h d d  understand, adds the Committee, that accept- 
ance of the measurn suggested by the experts constitutes a 
condition for aid to be gtnnted. The Report concludes: "In 
order that the Ad Hoc committees' work take place under the 
k t  +blc conditions, it appears indbpumbte that govan- 
men& submitting thdr program for tvaluation, as wdl as 
members of the conmi- feel certaia that their racommmdsr- 
tions will be properly d d a e d  with + to the finzJ adoption 
of dcvcIopmmt propma'  (Ibid., p. 21.) 
It is now &U to u n d m  why natiod dwchpmmt 
pmgmm are bdag -tad to the committea ob the OM. 
Th e  Charter of Punk dd Estt statcs that "the r c m m m c n d a ~  
of the Ad Hoc cormnitkts will bt of vital impomme in deter- 
mining the distribution of public funds under the Alliance for 
Progrm." American &&Is have btm evcn more explicit: 
M- Sccretarg of the T m  h g h a  Dillon, and Prctsi- 
dent K e d y  him!& have time and again underlined thc 
d d v e  importan- attached to the agreement and recommends- 
tiom of the OAS co&thm in obtaining *cia1 aid within 
the framework of the Alliance. 
The Rerub  of h Alliancs 
U p  to this point we have examined the Alliance's principal 
methods of operation and its internal organization. We shall now 
inquire into its mdta 
Some people fed that ALPRO d-es credit for having 
obliged each country to plan its future and to elabomte national 
development programs. There is an ever more widespread con- 
viction that Latin Ame~ica's mnomic evolution cannot proceed 
within a framework and under conditions sucb as existed at 
the time of the indusbial revolution. For this reawn, attempt$ 
at planning arc viewed with interest and sympathy, all the more 
so since we are cormious of the fact that in each of the Latin 
American republics today there is anarchy and waste of human 
and m a t e d  mums, and that it b therefore mential to 
insure a minimum of rationabtion and productive effort. U p  
to now, however, only a few countries have formulated devdop- 
mmt programs in conformity with the charter of Punta del 
Estc. If this i d n g ,  the character of the pmgmms presented 
for coasidtration by the OAS is even mom rwealing. 
T h e  development progtrams arc daborated under con&- 
tiom which are unstable and unpredictable. When it is sug- 
gested that they ahodd wrve only as "points of rcfertnce" or as 
h t m m m t s  of "atraw'%hi& may guide monetary policy and 
gwtramcnt txpmditure, the inadequate and in h g c  part 
demagogic nature of such programs soon b e m a  evident; an 
the other hand, whcrwa wc find even the slightat insinuation 
that it would be d d  to incorporate the hasic element0 of 
genuine planning, the +tion rnultipk like mushrooms 
and the charnpiona of free e n k p k  begin to scream to high 
hmvcn. T h e  pmgmm submitted are not intcndcd to abolish 
m a d y  nor to subject the vcsbed intcmts and privilcgm of the 
minority to tbe in- of the nation as a whole. What they do 
rather is to *-with a heavy dost of vague optimism and good 
in t en t io~bout  c c d n  univeIsats mch as the rate of growth 
of the economy, the cdficitllt of invutment, the probable 
volume of public qxnditurr and pivatt in-ent, without 
taking into account any changes in ccommic zrtructure, lea* 
adde concrete projects which need em-, and ignoring 
tht mttbah of mckhg urgent problems. Moreover, there is no 
certainty about the attainability of even the very limited ob- 
jedm indica&d. 
Thest limitationn done woutd seem d c i e n t  to determine 
the outcome. But there ia men mm: thc beginnings of plan- 
ning in Latin America, as practiced under ALPRO, arc neither 
the d t  d any profound social change nor the consequenct 
of the broad moWzation of democratic f o m .  The original 
ptatls arc not being formulated by the people, nor for that m a w  
by the government it& in any coordinated manner; they tmcrge 
from mme obscure office where a few technical experts wark 
in nw-secrecy. Thus, there exists no semblance of democratic 
pfanning but merely some kind of bureaucratic planning. It i 
consided unneceslsary tbat tbe majority of the population, 
who are to produce the futum wealth aimed at in the develop 
m a t  plan, should actively participate in its formulation or in 
checking its fdf~llmen~ Tt is sufficient that they should, if all 
goes w d ,  receive some compensation in the form of govern- 
ment txpcnditure or a Iittle more fmdd aid from abroad, 
It is true that the Committee of Nhc and other high 
officials of the Alliance have underlined the "need far &cipa- 
tion on the part of all sectors of the nation in the formulation 
of dtvdopmtnt programs." (Ibid,, p. 27.) They have, however, 
failed to e+in how this might be achieved in countria where 
democracy is conspimow onIy by its abstnct and where the 
majority of the popnlatim ncver pwticipatcrr wen in the most 
mod- decisions on a purely I d  level, to say nothing of dmx 
affecting the preparation af national dtvelopment p q p m  
The plan recently b w n  up by Mexico and alrtady prc- 
send  to the OAS ia a case in pint. It is no exaggeration to 
state that h d y  anyone knows anything about the plan or its 
objectiws, has any idea about thc effort8 that wouId be required 
from all Mexicans if the plan were to be s u c d y  impk- 
mentcd. The plan Jwas not baen publicly d k w d ;  neither 
mts, mimin, Wcnnen, workem, nor factory staffs +ci- 
pated in its fmulation. Not wen p r o f m i d  men, or for that 
matter Senators and Dtputia, were pmtiody consulted. It has 
been said that vcry few outstanding technical experts hdpd to 
draw up the plan, and it is believed to have come as a mpxk 
to sewral Mi&tcrs w h m  mlmmbates would have to k d a t e  
into practice pjem which they had neither studied nor ap- 
proved. 
We could say much more on this aubject, but let us go on to 
consider the part played by d c d  structural reforms within 
the framework of the AUiance, so that we may lx better able 
to evaluate them in comcction with the d t r r  achieved. 
It has bma acknowkdgtd for some time past that Latin 
America is in naed of &a1 reforms as a prtquisite to economic 
development and political stability. Recognizing that conditions 
vary from country to country, and at the risk of lumping them 
all together by way of ovasimplification, Iet me say that the 
areas where the need for has been continually strwacd 
bear tbe following characteristies throughout the continent: 
Land division is highly hadquatc; latifundia and mini- 
fundia abound; management and the vtem of credit are, in 
large part, in the hands d padtical gnwp who exploit the 
peasant iniquitously; agricultural returns are uassttkfactory, and 
total ruraI production remains Iow. 
Taxes art very low in m t  caws and very high in others; 
but praticaIIy everyhere the system of taxation, and of public 
finance in general, shows the same dtfe-: Revenue is inadc- 
quatc sand depmds, In largt meamre, on k t  tasation, laving 
ample opportunity for taxmasion; budget control is insufficient ; 
xmxt public mpnditure can hardy bt tmcd  productive; h e  
pub?ic debt tcads to grow in an ti^ spiral, and m o m  
policy is not ddgncd to promote economic dmbpmcnt 
Educational cxpdturt  repmts  but a tiny part of the 
nationd income and, in addition, is M y  distributed from a 
gaographic, mmomic, and social point of view; illiteracy is 
widespread and there exis@ an o v e d  lack of schools on all levels, 
Public admhbtmtion is d d d v e  and is characterized by 
gaps and maladjustmenls wbi& d t  in bumucracy and in- 
cffidcncy. 
Some countries boast of no labor legidation of any kind 
to protect workers and grant them certain fundamental rights; 
in otbexs, including those where rclativeIy pm@ve legislation 
has been for example, in M&co-mch laws have 
become a dead fetttr. 
In many other fields basic reforms are, of course, aeeded 
on which the OAS q e r @  surely never-or hardy ever-&t. 
T o  list only a few, thue are the system of credit, the stock 
market, the oqpmbtion and operation of foreign trade, the 
distribution of income, and the principles of government inter- 
vention in the national economy. 
A peculiar situation has arisen with regard to the need for 
basic ref- although at bottom the situation is not difficult to 
understand. At the beginning of the Allkma for Progress, many 
pemns believed that reforms constituted a prerequisite for the 
-ts promised at Punta del Este. This left the conservatives 
aghast, but p l e d  thaae who had long been conviucd of the 
n d t y  of adopting certain refom. Matters, however, became 
&died little, by Iittle ; and little by little, too, the premature 
fm vanished together with the u n j 6 e d  hopes. 
Faced with the apprehensions of those who owe their wealth 
and privileges to the d v d  of anachronistic social structures, 
ALPRO officials have had to be very outspoken: Structural re- 
forms, the Committee of N k  has stated, are not a prerequisite 
to foreign aid. The Ad Hoc committea are, therefore, to mnf~nt 
thmdvta  to "an appreciation of good will wherwtr it exists 
[sic] to carry out needed r t f m  and to detwmint at which 
points . . . ex ishg codtimu may be adapted to mggmtcd 
objectivts." (Ibid., p. 32.) The committet itself, mwerthdesp, 
considers the &tion of r d o m  to bt an obligation deriving 
fmm an inmnatiod statute which maka the OAS the principal 
arbiter of Latin American life and relegates our constitutiom a 
rank below, or at madlt equal to that of the Charter of Punta 
ddEste. 
With rcgard to mart &oms, we once again come acrm 
the same contradictions we have already mcountercd in mnnac- 
tion with national development pmgmn~. The opportunity to 
any out one of the prop04 refom hardly a r k  when in- 
mefable and often imumountable obstacles are put in the 
way of any conttmplakd economic or mckd change; when tbis 
ocrm*l, the authoritia kgin to tern*, and the most d e m  
pnouncemcnts turn into N o w  phrases; a little later, more 
limited r t f o m  art prom, and dapite the fact that they are 
indispensabIe even within the narrow framework af tht AUiance, 
they too b e m e  e b k ,  as they begin to arouse the h d t y  
of all who might bt a d d y  affected, from off~cials charged 
with bringing them about, to ohtinate national and foreign 
invmtors who see their in- threatened. 
An Amaim ptricdical recently quoted the revealing 
opinion of a Chilean economist: 'To try to modiiy from one 
day to the next a c h  system which has existed for centuries 
is to play with fire. Any hurried attempt to reduce the contrast 
b e e n  rich and poor must produce serious difficulties." ( U.S. 
News 8 World Report, February 14, 1962.) Since ALPRO, 
natudy, d w  not pretend to modify, but rather intends to 
preseme, the ''k sysetm," the opinion quoted is of some 
sign5cance. The Post Gazette of Pimbuxgh m t e  on the same 
subject in August of last year, "as in other parts of the world, 
k in Latin America who enjoy +aI privileges fmquently 
o p p  any social change, tspecidy if such change implits 
materia1 losses." Teodom MC~SCOSO h i d  has rccogrrized that 
the "extremely rich and powedul minorities . . . refuse to rc- 
linquish tven an ounce of their comfort or the smallest part of 
their virtu* tax-exempt incomes." The F d  jowdht, 
Claude Julien, scmtinizing the work of the Alliance 14 months 
aftcr its initiatian, noted that "the large landowners do not 
wish co hear of agtarian reform, just as othtr privileged pup 
do not cherish the mention of fiscal reform. Mortovtr, they 
denounce as Corn& anyone who ash for such i h l  or 
land reforms as art advacated by Mr. Kennedy." (k Monde, 
quotad in Comerciu Exterior, Dcccmbtr, 1962.) In the same 
way, we might add, that Mr. b o d y  would IaM "Corn- 
m&" anyone who proposed the breakup of the large estate3 
or touched the other interests of North Amtrim invaton in 
ht in Amwica. 
The condusion is ttlling: Every day they talk more and 
more of the need for such and such a reform, and every day 
they move further away fmm any e b i l i t y  of carrying out any 
type of reform. Eighteen months after the Alliance was hunched, 
we must ask ourselves: Where is the land reform which was 
going to modify the tenancy system, reduce exploitation, split 
up the large &a% and tstabw the basis for a new type 
of agricdture? Where are the fiscal reforms which were to 
result in a new and unjust sysm of taxation? Where is the 
monetary policy which was to combat the "evils of inflation" 
and defmd the purchasing power of the many? Where is the 
just basic wage and the r a p t  for the independence of l a b r  
organizations? Surtly few, if any, of the highfalutin phrases 
of Punta del Este have been tramdated into policy. The agricul- 
tural structure of ]Latin America has not changed in the past 
two years, nor the unwillingness on the part of the ruling cliques - 
to carry out any typc of reform, except the kind of superficial 
and burcaucmtic reforms which respect vested interests and 
have been impased from above, financed from abroad, and 
approved of by the landownen in Venezuela, Colombia, and 
Peru. Nor h the tax system been modified, except to an 
insignificant degree in Mexico and two or three other countrim- 
modifications which leave the system as unfair, regressive, 
and anti-popular as before. Monetary policy continues to suf- 
focate within the orthodox and h a d e n t  framework of the 
International Monetary Fund's recommendatians ; and =-called 
pmpms of stability and austerity paradoxically serve only to 
intensify stagnation, inflation, and the impoverishment of the 
majority. Workrm in rural and urban areas alike continue to 
live on miserable wagcp, dm d u i n g  the arb iw A t  
d thdr o r g m h t i q  h n h l l y  i m p d  by officials and M- 
~ h t h c n a m e o f ~ m .  
What of the degree of economic i n w o n  achieved to 
date? Without going back to the Treaty of Montevideo, which 
would lead us too far away f m  our central topic and wouId 
q u i r e  much fullcr trcament, it might be well to examine 
twa or thee qudons briefly. Economic integration, the Corn- 
mi- of Nine pain& out, 'hwt be examined witbin the general 
context of thc AIIiancc for Progms,'' since it is c l d y  tied up 
with W e  nationd devdopent programs and the psibilities 
of rapid growth in ILatia American productivity." (OP. kt, 
p. 76.) Integration should, momer,  primarily be considered 
"as a problem of inve&nent and secondarily as a problem of 
trade." 
These views ~ e c m  worth examining for a moment. Why 
should integration be considend within the context of ALPRO? 
Only because it is intimately tied up with the pme?rs of national 
development programs? T h e  basic problem surely is how to 
achieve integration and in what direction to guide it, to know 
whether integration is to be conceived as a Latin American 
alliance destined to faditate the development of our countria 
and their interchange in the face of the great powers which in 
one way or anothcr aiways succeed in putting new obstacles 
in our way, or whether integration will take on the character of 
a joint effort within the framework of the Alliance, which 
ignores the basic contradictions ktween Latin America and the 
United States. Integration within the system of ALPRO win 
strip the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) 
of its basic Latin American character and convert it into one 
more inter-American b e n t ,  which for obvious reasons win 
be unable to accomplish the tasks posed at the time of its 
establishment. 
Here we arc faced with another danger: Unlm the mem- 
ben of LAFTA bke prompt and effective measures to make 
certain that any benefib which may accme from it should go to 
thur own mpective national enterprises, the conctwions already 
gmnted will d t  in heavy and uujustXed advantages to 
fomagn, and ia particuIar North Ametr'can, investom. 
If some who may be over+ptimistic with regard to integra- 
tion, see a +bIe line of dense  in membership in LAFTA, 
0th- will point to contmdictiwls which show the true position 
of the United States. Wa&k@ods attitude toward LAFTA has 
undergone an evolution, pising from an original state of in- 
diffemnce, d k U e ,  and even Mated instances d hostility, to one 
which conditionally recognim the nead "to support any type 
of economic inteption which favors the expamion of markets 
and offers wider scope for competition." (En  Camino de h 
Integracidn, supplement to Comercio Exterior, M d c o  City, 
September-October, 1962. ) 
It will be appreciated that the United States, conscious of 
its power and loyal to its established mmmercid policy, d m  
not support the type of integration which tends to strengthen 
the competitive p i t ion of Latin America vis-a-vis the great 
powem, but supporn rather a "wider =ope of competition" as 
such. 
This pdtion on the part of the United States will obviously 
be vcry difhdt to h g e  and constitutes one of the factom 
which condition tht rhythm and above all the dirtction of 
economic integration. The proofs arc manifold: Only a few 
w& ago, the United States cx i t ikd  Brad's decision to 
diversify her fordgn trade and to establish clma contacts with 
the socialist countries. It a h  c r i t i c i d  the "discriminatory" 
character of B d s  exchange policy with =gad to members of 
LAFTA, a position which -tially wincided with that which - 
Douglas Dillon had recentIy outlined at the latest d o n  d the 
Inter-American Economic and S o d  Council. 
All this shows that economic integration, which in fact 
has made little progrm, is faced with an inevitable dilemma. 
Yet, on its solution depends the fate of LAFTA and the 
Central American Common Market. Either integration will 
dedop into an i-ment strengthening, consolidating, and 
helping to cMUdimte the economic and commercial develop 
ment of the d t e d  counsia, and will be combined with an 
active policy of diversification in terms of foreign trade; or 
integration, within the context of the Alliance, will mask a 
palicy which subordinah ht in  Amezican in- to the de- 
mands of continental sofidarity-which means at bottom to the 
demands of American in- In the latter case, thc h o p  
raised by the prospect d integration will soon k converted 
into new frusmtiom. 
In tbis connection, we cannot pam over a recent occumncc 
which clearly rewals the dangers of the wrong kind of integra- 
tion: When Cuba reccntIy applied for membmhip in LAFTA, 
integration was put to ita fmt test and came out poorly. For 
instead of accepting Cuba's application, U F T A  argued that it 
could not gmnt membmhip to a country "whom economic 
system was incompatible with the Treaty of Montevideo." The 
position of the Mexican government was even more explicit: 
"In view of the prineipla of free enterprise and free competition 
on which the Treaty of Montevideo is based," it d e d a ~ d ,  "a 
country where policy, foreign trade, and production are in the 
hands of the government is ineligible for membedtip, since 
this constitutes a case which the Treaty did not f o ~ . "  If 
in effect Cuba's czm waa not, and could not have been, fameen 
although in the exercise of sovereignty each country may 
choose the economic and political system it prefem-the truth 
of the matter is that LAFTA on this occasion acted as the 
too1 of OAS, adding alleged "economic incompatibility" to the 
"political incompatibility" which m e  months previously at 
Punk del Este had served as a pretext to exclude Cuba from 
that organhtion. 
Let us now examine the part played by foreign financial 
aid which, as we know, is another pillar of the Alliance for 
pro-. 
At the beginning of the Punta del Este conference, Ameri- 
can leadership underwent a mental change similar to that which 
we have h d y  noted in connection with economic development 
programs and s o d  r e f o m  The change e x p m d  it9elf in 
recognizing the need of appreciably augmenting the volume of 
foreign financial aid and of admitting, on the W s  of resolutions 
passed shortly More at the Inter-American conferenct at Bogota, 
the n d t y  of more adequate and more flexible conditions of 
finaxld adstance. In accordance with these concepts, htin 
America was off& credits and investments to the extent d at 
least $2,000 d o n  annually, and the United States alone 
pmmkd to contribute a minimum of $1,000 million during 
the fimt y w  of the Alliance. 
What is the meaning of a conbibution of $2,000 million per 
mum? Certain circles in M c a ,  as well as in Latin America, 
believe that foreign financial aid will p m  the M v e  factor 
in our economic ddopment during the coming decade. Thm 
m a h  m e  who believe that the rate of in-ent k in Iarge 
part dependent on foreign aid and that with kcwised aid it will 
i#so facto ise above the levels of previou yema ALPRO's 
experts &matt that Latin Amdca, in order to achieve the 
rate of growth blueprinted at Punta dd  Bte, will requim a total 
inwstmmt of $140,000-$170,000 million during the first ten 
ycars, which would leave foreign f d  aid with a pdcipa- 
tion of roughly between 12 and 14 percent of gross capital 
formation. 
Here, however, we need to keep steveral facts in mind. In the 
fimt place, mntrslry to what might be m e d ,  total foreign 
inwtment has bttn considerable during &c past few years. 
It has been running at between $1 ,50&$1,700 minion annually, 
figures which are very close to the pro& hdd out at Punta 
dcl Este. In the xcond phcc-and here we must be careful to 
d e c t  on the factors which detennine Latin American dewdop- 
mmt--cvcn this substantiat ratt of foreign i n v m e n t  has been 
unable to free Latin America from economic stagnation, which, 
on the contrary, has becomt more pronounced. Last, considering 
the role played by foreign aid, we must not forget that even if 
the international movement of capital generates additional 
financial resouma, it simultancous~y causes a drainage of funds 
which almost always exceeds the rate of innow. 
According to available &imam, direct foreign investments 
in Latin America during the decade 1950-1960 armunted to 
$6,179 million, while pmfrts tmdmed abroad totalled $1 1,083 
million, In other words, Latin America suffered a net loss of 
$4,904 d o n  on foreign investment account. For the years 
1950-1 955 thcse f i p  indude only profits transmitted to the 
United States. If we add r e h i o m  to Europe, the aggregate 
Ism wodd surcly the $5,000 million mark. The exactions 
of foreign investors are of such pportions that the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America cdctdated 
that they amounted to 9680 million in 1947, $940 million in 
1951, and to more than $l,2OO mihn annually during the 
ytanr 1955-1960. 
In view of thew @pa, it may stem somewhat ;Purprising 
that the President af the United Statq rcviewhg the mcmuwj 
taken by ALPRO, laid aost emphasis on thc fact that one out 
of tvery four ehildmn of s c h d  age "ndvcd supplemmtary 
rations out: of U.S. ag'idtud surplusa'; that onc and a half 
-on tcxtboob had bem Mbuted and 17,000 c b r m m s  
conrrtructui; that '%o a large d t p  the Aaiancc enmuragea our 
~ h b o m t o h d p ~ d t o a d o p t v a r i ~ ~ ~ r c f ~ o n  
their own initiative; that tht Allianoe will providt new housing, 
and hopc, bttter h d &  and dignity for d o n s  of foqyttm 
human w!' (H Dia, Febbruary 17, 1963.) Douglas Dibn, 
summing up the achievements of thc AIliaacc during its fmt 
year d dstmcq pointed out coldIy4ike the banker he is and 
without -dent Kennedy's rhctoic--that the main achieve- 
ment was that the United State was granting the W aid 
p r o d d  at Punta dtl Esk 
During tbc frrzrt year, Latin Amaica d v t d  a litde over 
$1,000 million in loamr from htitutiom controlled by, or under 
the influence of, the g o v ~ u 1 t  of the United Statts. Out of 
this sum, $600 million m Ew-Import  Bank credib, with 
strings attached-the Bank's midon bdng to further the export 
of U.S. go&-and $150 miIlion werc f d e d  in the form of 
surplus food, under the 'Tmd for Peace" scheme, a program 
which frequently opates on the h i s  of dumping, c a w  
incalcuhble hann to local producers. Even though credits and 
invatments were obtained &where in smaller quantities, the 
totaI amount of *vak invment  declincd and the total infIux 
of funds ncnr sufficed to cornpe~l~atc for tht outflow of profib 
on f d g n  invabncnts or the 1- coming fmm deterioration 
of the terms d trade, which vastly exceeded the of 
$2,000 million per amum. Added to this are the hund~ds  of 
millions of donam which wealthy Latin Americans mnsfer each 
ycar to S h ,  American, and Canadian hanks. 
Where then ia the acceleration of economic dtvelopmcnt 
and the impmvement in prices for Latin Amedcan expo-? 
Instmd d a rising standard of living, stagnation and pmtratim 
continue to dominate the Itatin Amerian scent; rather than 
recdving higher prices for our we receive h tvery 
day and in Gxchangt pay matt for whatever we purchab# 
abroad. Even the m a  aim of an annual 2.5 percent increase 
in the rate of cmmmic p w t h  is beginning to he d d e r c d  
too ambitious, and they h d y  tell us that it will be more 
&tic ta think in term of more than ten yeara and of an 
annual per capita incraw of only 2 percent. E v a  2 percent, 
however, is almost twice as high as the increase Latin America 
has beta abIe to achieve during the past two years. To sum 
up, the fruits of tht Alliance have been meager and it has 
failed not d y  to " c a p r e  the imagination or kindle the hope 
of d o n s  of human bdw from the Rio Grande to Patagania," 
as TBodoro Moscoeo so l$calIy put it (CcProbbmcaf de b Alianza 
firs el Propeso" in Comsrcio ExtePior, February, 1962), but 
has dhppohtcd even its most ardent pactisans, such as Kubit- 
schtk and Wems Camargo, and has failed in the sense that its 
initial prop& have been drowned in the mire of bureaucracy, 
inefficiency, a lack of understanding, and an abundance of 
c o n t r a d i c t i ~ b m ~  by the weight of an oppresive 
d t y  which, contrary to predictions, doe not seem to show 
any mgm of improvement. 
It is, indeed, interePting to observe how tht idea has taken 
root, both in the United States and among our "democratic 
oligarchi~''-to use the picturesque expression of a Mexican 
Senato~~that the fundamental need consists in obtaining more 
money and in stimulating private i n w e n t  rather than in 
tmmfomnhg the economy with a view to widening its horizons 
aad opening up new vistas of p r o p .  
? h e  premature exhaustion on the part of the AIliance," 
said a recent qmrt of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company 
( M a t e d  Pms release, February 15, 1 963 ) , "is in part simply 
the wearinesrr catmd by words rather than deeds, words which 
have not yet been tmdated into action. . , . The prerequisite for 
bttter d t s  must be the AUanct's reorientation aIong lines 
which will induce ~ v a t e  capita , . . to enter into action," 
me Wail Street l o u d  opim that aid on an inter-govern- 
mental basis has retardcd development and that it is n e w  
to w c o ~  private in-t (ExciLn'or, February 12, 1963 ) . 
' I l e  pt.iodicaI UJ. N m s  B Wmld Report (August 20, 1962) 
considers that tht AIlkum's ddtcts lie in its '2ack af stimulus 
to pzivatc mkprk" And Senator Javits recently ddarcd in 
a speech that "Latin Amdcan pmgms will d q m d  on s u c a d d  
in-t in pxivate entcrprk." (El  Dia, January 30, 1963.) 
Si* views can lx heard every day. 'The A[liaxllx," 
said the Chairman of the G m  Line early this year, "can be 
saved d y  on the baais of a substantial inmew in aid, coupled 
with the tncouragcmat of private hvtstment and p'ivaa 
mtq i se . "  (ExcbLrior, February 3, 1963.) The attitude of U.S. 
Scmbry of Commrcc Luther H+ and p h a  Am&- 
GU bankers, hcadbd by lhvid Rccktfck, has been the same, 
when they mgg& that "Amcairn aid should be utilized to 
penma& the nations nf Latin America to adopt pIi& favor- 
able to Amaican fiaadd iavemncnts." (EZ Dia, February 3, 
1963,) 
The True Significance of +he Alliance and I)r Pmpsdim 
Thisb~wtoourlastpoia~anattempttaestabfishtht 
true n a m  and =ope af thc Alliance for ProgrerrP. 
The advacates of ALPRO show a pwptible, and at titimes 
exceedingly swpicious, d& to define the AEime as 'hulti- 
lateral," "Lzrtin American," and "f~~olutionacy." ' t us once 
again t r a d m  the American continent"d M d e n t  Ken- 
nedy in launching the AUiance, "into a vast mdble of revdu- 
tiwary ideas and efforts. . . . k t  US oxace again awaken our 
Amelican ~olution," and put our faith in the "Rllt of murap 
and freedom and hopt for the future of man!' RaGI Prebisch, 
far his part, has at various tima m d  the Latin Amexican 
origin of many of tbe Alliance's feature and has tx-d the 
fmr lest such idea be regarded as having been "conceivtd in the 
United Stam" 
The indefatigable and ingenious TBodoro Moscoso, who 
never s t o p  insisting that the AEance represents a "peaceful 
revoIution," has stated ernphatidy: 'The Alliance, if sue- 
fd, will produce far-reaching changes in the life of Latin 
Amtrim. The tditiond claznr structure win not survive. Thc 
profound contrast between the few who Zin in abundance and 
the many who live in mimy has no mom place in our time." 
And the &nunittee of Nine dways xdntah that the Alliance 
ia not a program im@ by the United State but an entity of 
ht in  -can ideas accepted by the United States. "The 
AUiance for Pmgrm," the m e  of the OAS never tire of 
r t p t h g ,  "is of a alut iomry nature and mq+d as such 
by the Unitad Stab.'' 
To what exknt is this, in dfcct, the true nature of the 
AUiance? To begin with, it is perfectly true that the Alliance 
was not imposed by the Unitad Stam, but originated from an 
agmment bthvtexz the government of that country and the 
governments of the Latin htr icaf l  republics. It is further true 
that the AUiancc poses pmbltms that are pertinent and wognizts 
the legitimate aspirations of our people. But as to i& "revo1u- 
tionary" h c t c r  or its "muttilateral" mechanism, that is 
another matter, "Dwing the first year of the Alliance," says the 
Committee af Nine, "except for the caf;e of Boliviag'-whmc 
program, we are bound to note, was never even e d n e d  by 
the OAS-"all aid has beca accordad on the basis of bilateral 
agreements, without mmpIying with the more formal procedures 
f o m n  by the Charter.'' (Op. cit., p. 67.) Where then is the 
AIliance's multilateral nature? 
And what of its profoundly "revolutionary" implications, 
and the manner in which these implications are recogmkd? 
The revolutionary nature of the Alliance, states the Committee 
of Nine, has not been undemtmi by the paople of h t i n  
America. It has not baen underst& "because the leaders of 
Latin America have newer presented it as such to their people." 
(Ibid., p. 57.) 1s it @ble that ALPRO experts would consider 
it sufficient if the leaders of Latin American pubIic apinion 
hai1e.d the Alliance as revolutionary? Are the people to accept 
even the OAS as a revolutionary body and admit that imperialist 
@icy as welI has suddenly turned revolutionary? 
In Mexico, to take an example, leaders of employers' 
group and of the bade unions, as well as public officials of 
different ranks, repeat at evay opportunity that ALPRO pur- 
sum aims identical to thost of the Mexican revolution. Who is 
supped to believe this? Who can compm the deeply dem* 
cratic mwlcment-amti-imptrialkt and anti-feuda-which a m  
in wr country in 1910 with the designs d the continent's ruling 
to pmewc their $tical and econamic privilegm in a- 
c h a n g t f o r ~ ~ p i d d o r m u i m p c d f m m a b o v c ? W h o  
would d u s c  Emilinnn Zapata and the v t a  who initiated 
our Zand reform under the slogan "Land and 1;ikmty" with 
Ttodom Macotmy Mufioz Marin, and the e x p a  of the O M ?  
United Stam policy toward Latin America always f&ws 
the mne, mck. After the em of tht God Neighbor policy, which 
Pmident Rooacvelt intmdumd within the framework of a 
damaatic dommtic program and a d c t c m k d  fight against 
fascism, all wc have r e m i d  from North Ameria is prtssure, 
intcrfeena, low priocs, Mc-yism, gifts with shin@ attached, 
investments which puvert our dwdopmmt and put brakes on 
our p r o m  as well as rhetoric in defease d free enterprise 
and the e d  Free World. fn 1946, at the very moment 
when the blooditst war in the history d mankind had come 
to an end, Winston Churcbill Lunched from the United Stab  
the f l c y  of the Cold War. Its effects upon Latin America smn 
became evident. In 1947 the Cold War made its triumphal 
entry at Ria dc Jandro and gave birth to the Inter-American 
Treaty of Recipmd himma. One year Iater the Cold War 
made itself fdt at Bogota, and in 1951 the st rude  against an 
d e g d  inkmationaI Communist conspiracy acquired new forms 
in Washingtony only to c t h i m t e  in 1954 in Fosttr Dull-' and 
Cadlo Armas' "gloious victory" over the Guatemalan d u -  
tion. 
Demands for &uncial aid and higher p r i a  for raw 
matexiah always risG in cqual proportion to Wdington's in- 
by the pvmmmb of various h t i n  Ameican 
republ imn the gravity of the twin dangers of "Communism" 
and 'Sntemal s u ~ o n , "  Moat Ltin Amuican gov~pmmts 
are inched to support United Statcs @icy, but in exchange 
they demand economic and hamid aid. Pior to 1958, pre- 
v d h g  conditions wme not such as to oblige the United Stam 
to offer aid to all rrlaiman~, Itt alone concede it. The triumph 
of the Cuban hdut ion changed mattem e c a n  -re 
increastd with a view W o p p h g  Cuba and mgthening the 
OM. In mid-I959 a confermct hdd at Santiago de Chile 
reiterated the principles of "repmxntativt democwcy." T h e  
following ytar, in Ria ,  the Cuban Revolution was dt- 
nounred as a fom of exm-conhtal intervention, p i n g  a 
threat to the mwity of the Americas. The principal ideas of 
the so-called "Opalion Pan-Am&" were recognized in the 
Act d Bogota, and some months l a b  the Chartcr of Punta 
dd EstG lcd to Cuba's txpukion fmm OM, its midist 
pvemment being pronounced "inoompatibl~" with the system 
of "representative democracy" prevalent throughout the 
Hemisphere. 
Thb was the p u s s  which shaped the pattern of the 
ARiance for Pro- btrument in defense of the ruling 
clamq an e x p d o n  of M A  and an o u p  of anti- 
C o m m h ,  an answer to popular discontent, a barricade 
q@mt any desire for emancipationI an alternative and a check 
to the Cuban Revolution, and a new Holy Atliance directed 
against tbc dutionary struggle of our p6ople. And yet 
ALPRO is not the samt old weapon which the United States 
has d t i d y  wed to protect her interests, The AUiance 
constitub a vast new attempt to convince Itatin America that 
her only road to p m p  is the one indicated by the United 
Stam. The road is paved with hitherto unknown mate*. 
ALPRQ dots mt m d m n i d y  v t  the same outworn phmm 
which never meant anything and never attracted anybody. The 
Alliance indicate0 a siflcant change, for until recently the 
United Stata openly defended the ink- of the ma& con- 
xwative groups, while now she takes a stand against the Iarge 
landowners and opposes the inequitable distribution of wealth. . 
The AEancc has, indeed, tmploycd a new idiom, undoubtedly 
incorporating somt ancient Latin American demands. T h e  pmb 
Ierns to which the AIliance dm are real enough and remain 
umdvcd.  Recognition of the need for sociat dorm 51 
ncw, as i the acknowledgment of the need for ample long-term 
credits at low rate of interst in order ta stimulate economic 
development. The Alliance is mt the coarse instrument of a 
blind and W t i w  policy? but an ingenious device, far more 
intdigcnt than the M d d  Plan and of wider scopt, with 
which the gcmmmmt~ af America have chmn to defend 
t h d v c s  against the red dangtr of rwolutionrvy change and 
the profound W tramdormation which threatens their vested 
in- Z n s y n & ~ t h c ~ d o e s n o t ~ t o w p c w i t h  
the phip.1 -d c a w  ob backwdncw, nor with thc 
poverty of Latin Ammica, but mcrely attempts to prrstrvc law 
and order and to apply the brakes to any pop* m o m e n t  
which might cause damage to the powers that be. In this 
attempt, the Glliancc puts fonuard & more or less super- 
ficial mtasureo which will hardly change the face of the 
contiatnt. 
It seems &cult to rtmain in doubt as to the ANbce's 
true nature. "We d d e r  this AUimcc," Josh Figueraa said 
recentiy, "as a &tic and defensive maswe on the part of the 
United States government. . . . Wc are. sati&od that the United 
States has taken up this struggle in the p & n  of her liberties 
and with a view to her own i n t d ,  in the ma- of a pro- 
ductive hatment rather than a mmt handout." Dcan Rusk, for 
his part, has written: 'The AUmce codtutcs a c o n e  part 
af an invisibte wholc . . . it reds an the concept that this Hemis- 
phere is part of W a k m  Civilization which we are pledged to 
defend" Witbin the fmmork of American anti-Cammukt 
policy, the AUiaact wiII obviousty not permit the violation of 
the interests of privileged group. M m  made this abundantly 
char when he said: "In supporting the AlIiance, members of 
the mditional ruling dam will have nothing to fear. . . . The 
Albme d e e m  their support, for is it not a call to their con- 
science and thcir patriotism and at the same time thdr very 
means of d d c f s t P '  The privileged p u p ,  he added, 'bust 
c h m  between the objectiw of the AUiance and e x p i n g  
thernselw to the dabucdvc type of ~wolution of a Fidel 
Cab.'' Romdo lktamourt, the Venezuelan pr&ie.nt who h2~9 
gained the dubious distinction in Washington of being "one of 
the outstanding anti-Communist leaden- in the Americas," in 
trying to explain the A&ncc's role, has been even more 
explicit: "We must help the p r , "  said he, Yn i n e r  to saw 
the rich." Ths Times of London commented with goad mamn 
(August 10, 1962) that ''the the haa has the object of 
that instintive suspicion Latin Americans for Nonh 
American motivts." 
The true nature of the AUiance, its antecedents, its pro- 
jection, and its =ope explain why it is failing. As we have 
xe.n, the Alliance does not try to tackle the basic problems of 
Latin Amuica. It pmjecta itself into fidds and w& 
M v e  ha ,  such as the problem of impxidim; its dis- 
cusions take placc within the framework of profound con- 
tradictions, and it is based on utopian principles. Its fail- is 
due not to it8 hrganization or its bureaucracy, but to i@ inner 
contradictions, to the obtacles which block the &tion of 
its progmns, to the grcady illusions which c a w  Lath 
privileged minorities to substitute 'Ymegg, a d t y ,  dedication, 
and ~ C C "  for the b r m m t  of the majority's living con- 
ditions, 
What may we then atpect from the Alliance? Has the 
ambitious scheme drawn up at h t a  dcl Este had no reper- 
cu&om throughout the continent? h our view, there have 
been cwhin conflicting influence8 which am, however, not 
mutually txclusivt. Thc Alliance for Pro- cannot htlp but 
have a certain impact on Latin A m e k m  devhpment; in fact, 
its impact is already being felt. In some countria, it has helped 
to improve thc financial situation, even if on a short-term b&, 
raising thc rate of inv&ment or accelerating the rhythm of 
development; in others, it has to a certain extent stimulated the 
construction of housing, schmfs, and health centers. The AUiance 
is very M y  encouraging a n u m b  of institutional reforms; 
and many Latin Americana who Eve on the margin of privilege 
defending thdr own clam intern, have begun to believe in 
dl good faith that such reforms are of s u b t ; a  significance 
in tams of Latin America's evolution. 
In conclusion, ALPRO can point to a c a t a h  amount of 
s u m  and m y ,  for mother few years, stem the tide of &a1 
and cconomlc change for which thc people of Latin America 
have begun to clamor, What seems equally &dent, however, is 
that the Allianct will not be able to solve any basic pmbIm, 
if d y  of ita dependence on form abroad, a dependence 
which has been one of the decisive musts of our hackwardntzrs. 
Within the framework of the Alliance, this deptndtncc cannot 
be b r o k ~  but can d y  bt rcinfmd.  
Toward R ~ H c  Sddionr 
Thc p S m b  who believe that latin American propa 
m~ be g d c d  only in h g W ,  in tam of Am+ loans and 
investments, froquendy give vent to the fear that should the 
Alliance fail, dl will bt lost. The revolution of " p r  expecta- 
tions" h turned into dmpondeacy, impotence, and Wusion- 
mat .  The people, however, take a different view in which there 
is w lmrm for fmmatiw. 
Without pretending in a few lines to set out Lsrtin American 
requkmtnts for pmgrm and imprwing living conditions, I 
would Zilre to mention only some of the factors which a~ im- 
perative if we want to register any advance. 
We must b t  of all destroy the old agtarian structure and 
lwnovc the o h &  which have hitha& prwented the land 
from king owned by th- who wark it. F m  Chile and 
A,rgentina to Colombia, Pm, and Mexico, everywhere we are 
faced with large estates, both old and new, which must be 
liquidated if we aspire to modern f o m  of agriculture, an 
extensive domatic market, industtiahtion worthy of the name, 
a better distribution of wealth and income, and a truly demo- 
cratic form of development. It should be understcod that 
agrarian dorm, the nature of which will of course vary from 
country to country, will not be promoted by the landownem but 
by the peasants, just as commercial refom dI not be initiated 
by middlemen, or the system of credit be rewnstructed by 
bankers and speculators. 
We must accelerate and reorient the process of capital 
accumulation; increase the rate of investment and channel 
available funds into thca fidds of activity which p d  to be 
mast productivt from an economic and social point of view. 
In order to c m y  out these projects, we need to achieve a faker 
distribution of national income, to reduce the lavish consump 
tiion of the rich, to r a k  the productivity of public expenditure, 
and to prevent the Latin Ammican economy from being bled 
to death by means of either foreign trade or foreign capital. 
We must m v w  the 4 t h  which today is in the hands of 
foreign trusts and r n o n ~ c s  and incorporate it into the na- 
tional patrimony. As fang as dm, lead and zinc, 4 and oil, 
ma+um and sulphur, much of our best land, the production 
of and trade in coffee, ootton, bananas, the richest fishing 
p n d s ,  and tht principal &mid and mechanical indwttia 
remain under fwcig.l1 coutrol, the Ltin Andm economy win 
continue to be tributary to others aud wiu never be able to 
diqmw. freely of its fruits or its labor and its m u m .  
We must revise the very premhs on which Latin American 
industdktion is to be bad,  project our economic d d o p  
ment into new paths, and direct it toward more ambitious gaals, 
so as to provide ourselva with genuine industries which will 
makt use of all productive potentiatitia. 
We must undemtand that to raise the standard of living 
of the majority constitutes not only an essential d aim but 
a prerequisite to economic dtpdopmcnt; we must a h  under- 
stand that improvement in the conditions of the working c b  
will be achieved only insofar as workers will be able to count 
on independent unions royally defendmg their i n m t s .  
We must tighten our oommerdal, politid, and cultural 
rclatim with Ofher Latin American countries and prevent 
foreign inkrats fmm becoming the long-m beneficiaries of this 
growing int4Tchge. 
Indqxndmdy of any development toward a Latin Ameri- 
cam Commoxl Market, we must adopt a policy which will 
d t  in the divtdication of our foreign trade. Going to Wash- 
ington to bcg-and at tima to implo-that our raw materials 
be granted better prim, a i d  imdwtaking bigger and better 
studits as to how to s t a b i i  the pricts of our products, have 
not helped to mIve Latin America's foreign exchange problems. 
To trade with an countries, and certainly with the m d k t  
countria, which undoubtedly show a more rapid rate of e m  
mmic growth and thus offer the best prospects, is today not * 
only an economic n e ~ t y ,  imposed by public sentiment, but 
also the road to independence which none of us can ignore. 
We must adopt effective measures to protect Latin America 
against capitd flight and other levies which tend to exhaust our 
financial m u m a .  We can no longer pennit our national 
mums and our productive enerw to be drained off, large 
sum of money to be annudy traderred abroad, foreign invest- 
ments to deprive us of far more weaIth than they conhibute. 
We must aim at genuine and disinterested international 
oooperation, reponding to the aspirations of our pooplt for 
progress and well-being, mqxcting our sovereignty, unaccom- 
panied by restrictive condition+-in short at -peration which 
will help to transEorm the 4 order rather than defend 
Hvileges and vested interests. 
We must see to it that govmmmts plan thdr activities 
and ratiodize their +hue, and that e c d c  and sodal 
policia correspond to the needs of the braad mam of the 
popuIatiw1. 
Wcrnustgudagainstjmitdaimsbcing~cdintomere 
$ma; wc must hakt that the public sector became more 
dcmmratic and that the common people participate in it rather 
than leave it in the hands of m e m h  or repremmtatiws of the 
aligadiepi which govern Latin America bday. As long as the 
demomatic forcts are aduded from gwmmtnt, as long as 
they mmin mere objects of h&ty and repr&m in the name 
of a n t i - C o m m ~  and the defense of the Hemisphere, so long 
will it pnwe impomible to k e n t  economic and social poficy in 
the sense that it wilf benefit the majority. 
hs t  but not 1- we must understand that no funda- 
mental or lasting progrm can be achieved on the bash of side- 
stepping the mo;pt scrim problems and refusing to come to grips 
with the form of impaiahrn. 
Xmperbkm remains the prinapal cause of Latin America's 
backwardness. At the same time, it constitutes the gravest 
threat which hovers over our people. The constantly repeated 
statement that "CastrP-Commh" h the greatest danger con- 
fronting the Amexicaa is both absurd and grotesgue. Who can 
redly believe that the Cuban Revolution has hampered our 
development, when Cuba today finds h d  in the front h e  
in the ddmx of liberty, dignhy, and the principles of self- 
determination and non-intemcntion on which all Latin American 
sovereignty must needs be b d ?  
The showy and pseudo-rcvdutionary robe which has d 
late cloaked American policy dom not signify that imperidm 
has ceased to be im*, but merdy that the oId garments 
are w m  out. 
We five in an age propitious to pm-. Impialislll: has 
ken weakened through the pcmm of all thast nations who 
today watch the dawn of their independence and are anxious 
to protect their autonomy. The struggle for full national eman- 
cipation is not a blindly chauvinistic struggle, nor is it doomed 
to fail. It is the only SQ& which wiU M us forward. It is 
thc mad to national dignity, progrts$ indtptndcnce, pace, and 
genuine inttmational cooption. Today tht triumph of Cuba's 
W u t i -  that of Mexico's -y-provcs the falacy 
ofthtamxmptioathatoufppk are hclple~~9iathcfacc of the 
memy. Co&ous of thc daagets and obgtacfeq which it would 
be wrong to und-te, we beIievt that this is the hour 
when we must not give way to defeatism. We must have 
umfidence in our cause and in our own mums. We must elaim 
our heritage with determination 4 without fear. We m w ~  
runember that national liberation is triumphant everywhere. 
We must unite in the beliefs of Bolivar, Modos, and San 
Martin. If we base our joint efforts on these priaciplas, con- 
scious of the fact that the -use of each is the cause of all, 
Latin America win sooner or later succeed in the struggle in 
which shc is today engagtd and which is wagcd to secure her 
;seoond indepcndenm. 
PAMPHLR PACKET $4 
Why Soeialirm7 
by Alber) Einstein m$ 
Principles of Communism by Engek 
(trans. by Paul M. Sweezy) 259 
Socialism Is the Only Answer 
by Huberman and Sweezy 35# 
Mamian Socialism: and Power Wte or Ruling Class? 
by Sweezy 359 
The Theory of US. Foreign Policy 
by Sweezy and Hubemn 35C 
Reflections on the Cuban Revolution 
by Paul A Baran a# 
The ABC of Socialism 
by Huberman and May so# 
Economic Developmerit, Planning, and 
International Cooperafion 
by Oskar bnge so# 
British Guiann 
by Ved Prakash Vntuk 501 
The War in Vietnam 
by Hugh Desntl so# 
The Split In The Capitalist World and 
In  The Socialist Warld 
by Swsezy and Hubeman so# 
Lafin America and fhe 
Alliance For Progress 
by Aknso Aguilar 504 
- 
Total $5.00 
PAMPHLET PACKET SPECIAL, 
All tha above pmmphlats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -64 
Send your order, with payment enclod,  +a 
Monthly Review Preu 333 Sirth Avenue New Yark 14, N. Y. 
C L O T H  BOO 
Price 
THREE TACTICS: THE BACKGROUm IN MAEX 
by 8 W w  Moore $2.26 
POLITICS AND LAW IN A F m A  
by Julius L e d  2.95 
WHITHER LATIN AMERICA? 
by Car101 Fnenta and  other^ 8.00 
REPOET TO T m  OLDE EBB 
by John Bwdw 3.00 
T H E ~ B T A ~ C Z T B A , A N D c A a T B O  
b y W U a m k W i U h m  &!26 
TEE 63EIX)ND BEYOLUTION M C U M  
by J. P. Morray La6 
CURA-ANATOMY OF A REVOLUTION 
by En- rrad Isweew 8.60 
GUERRILLA WARFABE by Che Buevam 8'60 
CROSSING !l'EJZ LINE by Claud Cmkbm 8.60 
AN E3SAY ON ECONOHIC GgO- AND PtANNING 
by h d c e  Dobb 8.60 
TEE LfFE AND IDEAS OF ROBERT OWEN 
ba A. L. Morton 8.60 
WELLINGTON mAD 
b a - M  8.75 
vIEwFIU)MTEEwEm 
by C l o d  cc&b~im 8.76 
BURNING CONSCIENCE 
by C]rrrrda a b  and Gather Andem 4.00 
THE ALIENATION OF MODEZW MAN 
by l M h  Pagpenheim 
PRIDE OF STATE by J. P. Morray 
TIDE WITHOUT T m N G  by John Gill 
THE MENACE OF THE MIRACLE: 
GERMANY FROM BITLER TO ADENAUER 
byHein%Abosch 
THE EMPIRE OF OIL by Harvey OtCollllor 
THE WALL BETWEEN by Anne Braden 
TEE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH 







NOW I N  P R I N T  
NORTH FROM MEXICO by Carey McmWama 
THE PRESENT AS HISTORY by Pad gt. S w m  
!l'EE m E Y  OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 
by Fad M. s- 
THE BAGGED TROUBERED PHIILAWHBOPIISTS 
bylbMmmdl 
THE GREAT ROAD by Amplee Sme& 
EDUCA'ITON AHID !l!EE WORKING CWLSB 
by Jaclnron snd Maraden 
CASTE, CtASS & RACE by OUyer C. Cor 
WORLD CRISIS IN OIL by Jhrvey 0'- 
FROM YALTA TO DISARMAMENT by J. P. Morray 
(4 AU f o n b  &a, add $1 to quotrd) 
U* pa- 
Priea w M  Sub 
5.00 9,oo 
5.00 3.00 
I B PAPERBACKS 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
by Jams Boggs , .............. $I.W 
CAPITAUSM YLSTERDAY AND TODAY 
by Maurlw Dobb (floriblm cloth binding) ................ 1.00 
THE ALIENATION OF MODERN MAN 
by Mlr P a p p h d m  ISs 
AMERICAN &ADlCALSr SOME PROBUMS AND PERSONALITIES 
Hamy Gddbug, dHw I S I  
AMERICAN U E U R  IN MIDPASSAGE 
Bar) Cothnn, db  131 
WHITHER UTlN AMERICA? 
by Carlos Fuontes and Otbmn ,.-.,-,--.--..---.-.-. 1.45 
MAN'S WORLDLY 6 0 0 D S  
by L.0 H u h n  I .76 
CUBA: ANATOMY OF A REVOLUTION 
by h a  Hubman mnd Pad M. S w o q  + 1.76 
THE PRESENT AS HISTORY 
by Paul M. Swmay (FIwIblo c l 4  binding) 2-96 
-
Total $13.66 
I PAPERBACK SPECIAL *II the .bow booh ---.....-.. $1  1.W I 
Monthly b v h w  h u  333 Skth Avonua Nw Y d  14, N. Y. 
Notes on 
CY 
MmMy Review publishes l m k ~  d ~ ~ e t s  in 
the fields of history, econmnics, polities, and world affairs; it 
publishes alao the m q p k e  MONTRLY m w  which analw 
world events from an indepdent &list point of view. 
Founded in 1949, MONTHLY REVIEW has steadily h c m d  i@ 
circulatim among ccommh, b t o r k q  political acktbtr, gw- 
ernment officials, businessmen, and libraries. On April 13, 1963 
BuJinm Week, the kading businma journal in the Unitad Stateq wn 
a sevm~lumn spmd on the m a g g  and ita dm Bw*ness 
W d 8 ~ ~  &Gem fof MONTHLY m w  b hd by the 
of kammia of Welt* College which d a ' b e d  it in the 
Wclbs&y &mnm Mag&#, d July, 1962, u thc ' ' l t d q  
Marxist inkkctual (not Cammunirt) e~opmnic journal pubhtd 
anywhen in the m l d ,  and it ir m our a u ~ ~  l it  at the 
College libraq for @ -*' 
MONTHLY m m W  h 011 fht 6 @ ( 1 1 1  fit 4 tha 
college a d  public l h u k  in tha country. Ita aukuiptb d 
rate by cmnomists, histmhq political scientists, and pemment 
off~ials is * .  high-pt'haps as high as &at of any 
magazine in the M W D ~ .  
The magazine, pamphlets, and books published by Monthly 
Review Pass are at once ahlady,  authoritative, and &- 
and therefore of interest to informed people -here. 
If you will send us your name md ad& we will send you 
a bmhure and sample copy of MONTHLY REVIEW, as well as a 
catalogue of books p u b W  by MR Prear. 
Name ...an....- "- Illl-r.l.y"..-.lll.~.-.- . .-....--- 
A d b  ... "....XI""..-" I----..-- -.,. ....-------...-.- --.I ...--.I..-*- 
City Zone ,...,. State -..-...-,..,-..-.. ..., 
MONTHLY REVIEW 
